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Abstract
In this exploratory research, we examine the effect of economic and noneconomic indicators on the
creation of Chinese Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission policies using a VAR model. We find
that CBIRC policies are predicted by State Council construction policies and policies set by the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange. This indicates that the CBIRC is inward-looking, observing what
other regulators are doing rather than responding to changes in the real and financial economy. This
may be a product of market distortions due to China’s unique blend of state-oriented and market-based
institutions.

Introduction
In this exploratory research, we examine the effect of economic and noneconomic indicators on the
creation of Chinese Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) policies using a VAR model.
We find that CBIRC policies are predicted by State Council construction policies and policies set by the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange. This indicates that the CBIRC is inward-looking, observing
what other regulators are doing rather than responding to changes in the real and financial economy.
This may be a product of market distortions due to China’s unique blend of state-oriented and marketbased institutions.
This paper is unique in predicting economic policy incidence. We test various indicators to discover
which variables might influence the number of policies created on a monthly basis by China’s banking
and insurance regulators, and find two that have a strong impact on CBIRC policy creation. This type of
study that attempts to explain how banking regulations are made is scarcely found in the literature, and
represents a new way of understanding the policy making process, particularly in a regulatory regime
that is frequently less transparent than in Western nations.
The importance of this type of study is substantial, since it can help policy watchers and investors
understand which direction Chinese policies are likely to take and why. This can help to reduce policy
uncertainty and increase investor and business confidence, creating a more stable economic
environment. Next, we turn to the literature review of this topic.
Literature Review
There is very little research that predicts policy incidence. One strain of Chinese policy prediction that
uses machine learning incorporates key words found in the People’s Daily to predict major policy
changes in China. This is developed within the Policy Change Index, created by the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University (Chan and Zhong 2019). In an article that incorporates this index, policy waves
predict the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the more recent supply-side structural
reform. This paper uses the gated recurrent units (GRU) model developed by Cho et al. (2014), to
analyze key phrases. Chinese monetary policy is another area in which policy has been predicted. For

example, Lu (2019) uses machine learning, in particular a neural network and error t-value test, to
predict monetary policy. In this paper, Lu examines the relationship between reserve adjustments and
financial markets.
There is also research that predicts financial distress. Behn et al (2017) construct an early-warning model
predict banking-sector vulnerabilities, finding that global credit growth in particular is a strong predictor
of domestic banking vulnerabilities. Petropoulos et al (2021) use various machine learning techniques to
predict bank insolvencies on US-based financial institutions, showing that the Random Forests model is
the best performing. Duca and Peltonen (2013) use multivariate discrete choice models that combine
domestic and global indicators of macro-financial vulnerabilities across 28 countries to predict systemic
financial crises. Betz et al (2014) use a new dataset that incorporates bankruptcies, defaults, state
interventions, and mergers in distress in order to predict bank distress in European banks.
A related body of research forecasts monetary policy. Vasnev, Skirtun, and Pauwels (2013) employ a
triple-choice probit method to forecast monetary policy decisions of the Reserve Bank of Australia,
finding that combined forecasts outperform multivariable models. Qiu, Li, and Qiu (2020) predict
monetary policy made by the People's Bank of China using a random forest algorithm model with 16
macroeconomic indicators. The model has a predictive accuracy of 79% in predicting monetary policy
direction.
As we can see, the literature on this topic is scarce. Therefore, we provide a backdrop against which our
study is made, providing an overview of China’s banking and insurance systems, as well as the regulatory
environment surrounding them.
China’s banking and insurance system and regulation
China’s financial system is dominated by banks, especially by the largest state-owned institutions. These
include the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of
China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and the Bank of Communications (BCOM). These banks
receive about one-half of the banking systems’ assets and deposits. These banks are listed on the stock
exchange and majority-owned by the government. The rest of the banking system contains twelve
smaller listed commercial banks, three ‘policy’ banks, a postal savings bank, over one hundred city
commercial banks, and three thousand credit cooperatives and rural finance organizations (Turner, Tan
and Sadeghian 2012).
The financial system has expanded over time with the growth of the shadow banking sector. Shadow
banking includes wealth management products, many of which are sold by banks, as well as trust
products sold by trust companies and asset management products sold by asset management
companies, and entrusted loans between enterprises. Many of these products and institutions have
been brought out of the shadows through regulation and are now counted as part of total social finance,
along with traditional bank loans.
The insurance industry includes life insurance and property–liability insurance. The life insurance sector
contains private health insurance and short-term casualty insurance. Social insurance provided by the
government are part of China’s social protection regime.
The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) is the central government regulator
for the banking and insurance industries. This body resulted from the merger of the China Banking

Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission in early 2018. The mandate of
the CBIRC is to supervise the banking and insurance sectors, as well as to ensure fair competition and
protect the rights of stakeholders (CBIRC 2021). This body is responsible for legislation just above the
most basic levels of legislation, which were enacted by the National People's Congress. These basic
levels of legislation include the Banking Regulation Law (2006), the People's Bank of China Law (2003)
and the Commercial bank Law (2015). The CBIRC is responsible for prudential regulation in the medium
term and fair competition in the long term. Much of the CBIRC’s regulation is comprised of guidance,
notice, and rules (Wang and Tan 2021).
The China Banking Regulatory Commission, which preceded the CBIRC, was set up in order to take action
against risks and destabilizing forces generated by the banks (Yazar 2015). This represented delegation
by the state in order to increase efficiency. This body was set up in 2003 as China prepared to open up
to foreign bank competition. The need to regulate foreign banks, as well as the occurrence of banking
scandals during this time resulted in the creation of the CBRC.
The CBRC assisted the process of banking reform. After the modernization of the banking system, the
initial wave of banking reform was implemented in the late 1990s, in order to reduce non-performing
loans at the major state-owned banks (Sun 2020). Asset management companies were created in order
to take on such non-performing assets and the banks received capital injections. In the second wave of
reform, starting in 2003, banks were required to improve corporate governance. Banks were financially
restructured and publicly listed.
The CBIRC issues prescriptive rules that cover a wide range of topics. Banks as well as their products and
services are covered by prudential regulation, and information disclosure is a key part of these rules (He
2012). As China’s banking system has developed, the CBIRC has taken the role of encouraging strong
banking practices in order to improve the direction of growth. In addition, the CBIRC controls the
appointment of banks’ directors and senior executives, who must be specific requirements in order to
hold office.
The global financial crisis had a significant impact on regulatory bodies around the world, as it revealed
shortcomings of principles-based regulation in the UK and rules-based regulation in the US. In response,
Chinese regulators further increased regulatory control, moving in the direction of command-control
regulation. The CBIRC then reformed the regulatory framework in 2015 and set up the Prudential
Regulation Bureau in order to unify rules of Prudential Management within the banking industry.
In 2018, the CBIRC introduced the Measures for the Liquidity Risk Management of Commercial Banks,
which implemented new indicators in conformance to Basel III liquidity risk requirements. These include
the net stable funding ratio, the liquidity matching ratio, and the adequacy ratio of high-quality liquid
assets, in addition to the traditional indicators, liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity ratio.
The CBIRC opened up further to foreign participation in the banking and insurance industries in 2018.
Restrictions on the foreign ownership cap in life insurance companies were eased from 50% to 51%,
foreign ownership limits in Chinese banks were removed, and allowing foreign-owned insurance
brokerages were permitted to operate at the same scope as domestic insurance brokerages (Chen and
Huang 2020). Foreign banks fall under rules similar to those of domestic banks in terms of establishment
or articles of association approval. However, foreign banks also require approval to engage in foreign

currency and RMB business such as taking deposits and issuing loans, providing letters of credit, and
engaging in interbank business.
The insurance industry became more focused on risks after the revision of the Insurance Law in 2009,
which improved information disclosure and consumer rights protection and standardized contracts and
procedures (Chen et al 2013). Greater focus was brought to ensure supervision of solvency and market
conduct. Chinese insurance regulators make use of on-site and off-site inspections to ensure compliance
and monitor risks.
Improvements in the insurance industry came as China’s domestic insurance market developed and as
the industry opened to foreign competition. Currently, there are several regulations that insurance
companies must comply with. Life insurance companies must be in compliance with the CBIRC rules that
include the Provisions on Basic Services for Life Insurance Business, the Administrative Provisions on
Authenticity Management of Personal Insurance Customer Information, and the Administrative
Provisions on Insurance Terms and Insurance Rates of Life Insurance Companies, among others.
Property and casualty insurers must meet rules including the Administrative Provisions on Insurance
Terms and Insurance Rates of Property Insurance Companies and the Guidelines on Development of
Insurance Products by Property Insurance Companies. Foreign insurance companies must follow the
requirements laid out by the Administrative Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Foreignfunded Insurance Companies, which ensure a minimum total capital, and the Implementing Rules for the
Administrative Regulations on Foreign invested Insurance Companies.
Regulations have kept pace with changes in the industry, catching up to international standards. Rules
introduced in 2020 attempted to improve supervision of insurance asset and liability management and
implement constraint-based asset and liability management (Ernst and Young 2020).
CBIRC leadership
The CBIRC leadership has had an impact on regulations implemented over the years. The first chairman
of the CBRC was Liu Mingkang, who served until 2011. Liu had served as Chairman of Bank of China,
Chairman of China Everbright Group, and Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China. Liu had been
sent in to China Everbright after the previous chairman was arrested for corruption, and later into the
Bank of China in the wake of another corruption scandal, this time at the US branch. Liu pushed the
Bank of China forward into financial reform, listing the Hong Kong operations of the bank successfully on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Naughton 2003).
As chairman of the CBRC, Liu helped to orient bank from serving state-owned enterprises to providing
retail banking services and serving the market economy. Liu also made the case for providing banks with
a permanent outlet for removing non-performing loans from their balance sheets (Reuters 2007). Liu
also ushered the banking system through the global financial crisis by investing a large amount of credit
to stabilize the financial economy (Xinhua 2010). During this time, the CBRC attempted to regulate
further the real estate industry and ensure funding availability to small and medium sized enterprises.
The next chairman was Shang Fulin. Shang had previously acted as Chairman of the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, President of the Agricultural Bank of China, and Vice-Governor of the People's
Bank of China. Shang aided the development of some private banks, first under pilot programs, then
under the supervision of local regulatory authorities. Shang aimed to steer the financial system toward

serving the needs of the real economy and increase the coverage of financial services (Liujiazui Forum
2012).
The first chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC, which was merged with the
CBIRC in 2018) was Ma Yongwei, whose tenure was from 1998 to 2002, at the initial establishment of
the CIRC. Ma had acted as president of the Agricultural Bank of China and chairman of the Chinese
People's Insurance Company. Ma set up insurance regulatory bureaus in 11 regions across China. Ma
established an insurance market framework with Chinese characteristics.
Wu Dingfu was chairman from 2002 to 2011. He had previously been Secretary-General of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and Vice Chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission.
As chairman of the CIRC, Wu helped to guide China’s insurance industry away from risks. Supervision of
senior executives was strengthened, and requirements for insurance companies to reduce fraud were
tightened (21st Century Business Herald 2010).
Xiang Junbo was chairman from 2011 to 2017. Xiang was formerly president and then chairman of the
Agricultural Bank of China as well as deputy governor of the People's Bank of China. Xiang was
investigated in 2017 for serious violations of discipline and removed from office, then expelled from
office.
The CIRC was merged with the CBRC in 2018 to improve its leadership. Guo Shuqing was appointed in
2017. In 2018, Guo was also named party secretary of the People’s Bank of China Party Committee in
order to improve communication between the two bodies. Guo held many high-profile state posts,
including director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, chairman of the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, and chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
Guo brought much-needed regulation to the CBIRC. He pointed out some of the pitfalls of products that
suffered from high risks due to a lack of transparency and aimed to fill regulatory gaps and update
regulations that had become outdated (China News Network 2017). Immediately in 2017, Guo
implemented 26 projects to make up for regulatory shortcomings. Shadow banking and cross-financing
among financial institutions became his focus.
Theoretical basis
Application of bank regulation can be viewed from several perspectives. The general theories of
microprudential and macroprudential regulation describe different methods of managing the financial
system. Microprudential regulation is based on the concept moral hazard deterrence; that is, bank
deposits are insured by the government and provide an incentive for managers to engage in risky
behavior (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein 2011). Therefore, microprudential regulation forces banks to
internalize losses. Macroprudential regulation controls for systemic risk. Such measures reduce the
social costs associated with a sudden shock to banks’ balance sheets.
China uses both microprudential and macroprudential regulation. The CBIRC has focused somewhat
more on microprudential regulation, with a more recent system of macroprudential regulations
introduced through Basel III regulations beginning in 2011 (Chance 2011). In addition, a Macro
Prudential Assessment (MPA) framework supervised by the People’s Bank of China was implemented on
January 1, 2016 in order to address pro-cyclicality, regulatory arbitrage, and enhance market-based
reforms (Zheng 2018).

While theories about microprudential and macroprudential regulation can be applied to China, theories
such as regulatory capture are not relevant. The regulatory capture theory states that it is inevitable for
the state’s regulatory function to be captured by those being regulated, since banks are able to lobby
the government. The Chinese government is closely connected to banks but has more control over
banks’ objectives than in Western economies.
Therefore, a separate theory for Chinese bank regulation holds more explanatory power. Cousin (2012)
asserts that Chinese supervision can be taken as core to its financial system, with Western regulatory
instruments used as add-ons. This is underscored by the fact that the state remains the banking safety
net, with the CBIRC possessing the power to take over failed institutions. Another way to state this is
that, even though the Chinese government created a separate regulatory body for banks and insurance
companies, this does not end collusion between the state and regulatory agencies. As a result, China
continues to demonstrate features of interventionist developmental state (Yazar 2015).
What is interesting and unique about China’s financial system is that, even though regulations following
Basel III regulatory theory were applied, including the principle of sound liquidity supervision, China’s
financial system remains, to some extent, financially repressed. Despite the fact that Chinese experts
have called for additional financial liberalization over the years, the process has been slow due to the
close relationship between state-owned banks and the government. In the wake of the global financial
crisis in particular, bank lending was used as a key channel of government fiscal stimulus, with much
lending provided to state-owned enterprises. This effectively acted as a tax on private firms, who are at
a disadvantage in obtaining bank loans under these circumstances. Although the government called on
banks to lend to small and medium sized enterprises, banks often failed to do so, given the alternative of
lending to state-owned enterprises whose ultimate backstop was the government.
Market distortions due to financial repression in the banking system have resulted in moral hazard, in
which banks take undue risks in the expectation that the government will step in if banks experience
financial deterioration. This has led to the need for constant regulatory action in order to make up for a
smoothly functioning market-based system. For example, as the shadow banking system arose in the
wake of the global financial crisis, banks took part by selling wealth management products, which often
contained excessively risky underlying assets. There was an expectation that the government would bail
out failed products. As a result, banking regulators had to create specific regulations to crack down on
the worst practices, such as bank-trust cooperation, in which banks raised funds through wealth
management products that were channeled to shadowy trust companies.
This means that China’s financially repressive system has given rise to distortions that have resulted in a
need to implement “extra” regulation that would not be necessary in a well-functioning, risk-controlling
banking system. Not only are microprudential and macroprudential regulations necessary, but due to
the close relationship between banks and the government, the government has been forced to carry out
some of the basic duties of risk management, which in a market-based system should normally fall to
individual banks, through regulation. This goes beyond enforcement of microprudential regulation, such
as enforcing Basel III standards. We call China’s style of regulation as it applies to unique risks arising
from moral hazard a market-distortion correction type of regulation.
China’s unique style of regulation has given rise to a special pattern of banking regulation, with spikes
during time of excessive risks. We next turn to an exploration of the data.

Data
First, we describe our data set. We use monthly data taken from February 2005-December 2017 (when
the data results for the dependent variable end). This monthly number of CBIRC policies is taken from
the Wanfang China Laws and Regulations Database. Spikes in regulation occurred in July 2015 and April
2010 as some financial risks rose.
Independent variables include the first difference of monthly State Administration of Foreign Exchange
policies and the first difference of construction-related State Council policies. Regulations from the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) are taken from the Wanfang China Laws and Regulations
Database and include the number of monthly regulations. SAFE is an agency that is responsible for
regulating foreign exchange and to gradually promote the convertibility of the RMB under the capital
account and further develop the foreign exchange market. Construction-related State Council
regulations are also taken from the Wanfang China Laws and Regulations Database.
Interestingly, we find that other variables that could impact CBIRC regulations per month did not do so.
These include financial and monetary indicators, such as interbank interest rates, M2, seven day repo
rate, and one year deposit benchmark rate, and real economic indicators, such as real estate
investment, producer price index, consumer price index, and economic policy uncertainty. News articles
did not impact CBIRC regulations. These include the mention of economic reform and, separately,
financial risk in the People’s Daily.
Model
In order to capture the dynamic relationship between CBIRC policy incidence (CBIRC), State
Administration of Foreign Exchange policies (SAFE) and the number of “Construction” mentions in State
Council regulations (CSC). We can apply a simple VAR model, which is often used in macroeconomic
analysis. The simple VAR model can be written as follows:
⃗⃗⃗
⃗ 𝑡−1 + 𝐴2 𝑌
⃗ 𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝 𝑌
⃗ 𝑡−𝑝 + ⃗⃗⃗
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝐴1 𝑌
𝜀𝑡
⃗ 𝑡−𝑝 is the pth lag of these variables, while ⃗⃗⃗
Where ⃗⃗⃗
𝑌𝑡 is the vector of all variables and 𝑌
𝜀𝑡 is the error
term. In the VAR model, all variables are treated as endogenous variables, which means that each of
them can be determined by of function of its own lags and the lags of other variables. For example, the
incidence of CBIRC can be influenced by its lags and the lags of SAFE and CSC. The lag period is chosen by
the information criteria.
Empirical Results
Before we analyze the relationship between these variables, we first divide the sample period into two
discrete parts. The first period is from 2005m2 to 2017m6, which is used to build the VAR model; this is
the training sample. The second period is from 2017m7 to 2017m12, which is used as the test sample,
and we can use the VAR model training estimation to forecast the incidence of CBIRC policy in the test
sample. In order to correctly build the VAR model, we first take difference of all variables to make sure
that all the time series are stationary, and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of all three variables
reject the null hypothesis that these time series have a unit root, which means we can use them to
estimate the VAR model.

As shown in Figure 1, all the time series are stationary. There are also some other unique characteristics
in the time series. First, the volatility of CBIRC policies is much bigger than other two variables. Second,
all the three variables fluctuate more in the end of 2009 and 2015 to 2016, which may be related to the
subprime crisis and the reform in the exchange rate regime in China. Lastly, all the variables show similar
fluctuations, which may be driven by the business or policy making cycle.

Figure1 Time series of different variables
Before we build the VAR model, we should choose the optimal lags of the VAR model, and this
determined by different information criteria, e.g., FPE, AIC, HQIC, SBIC. As shown in Table 1, most
information criteria reveal that 5 is the optimal lag period. So, in our next analysis, we use VAR (5) as the
baseline model. The HIQC and SBIC tests show that 4 and 3 are optimal lag periods. Therefore, in the
robustness test, we consider different lags and the main conclusions still hold.
Table1 The optimal lags of the VAR model
lag
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

LL
-1000.07
-928.416
-906.696
-883.55
-867.888
-857.881
-852.904
-849.558
-838.756
-834.208
-825.487

LR
143.3
43.442
46.291
31.324
20.014
9.9534
6.6934
21.603
9.0966
17.442*

df
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

p
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.018
0.354
0.669
0.010
0.428
0.042

FPE
372.032
151.047
125.809
102.691
93.3881
92.1762*
97.8741
106.475
104.147
111.581
112.717

AIC
14.4326
13.5312
13.3481
13.1446
13.0488
13.0343*
13.0921
13.1735
13.1476
13.2116
13.2156

HQIC
14.4583
13.6341
13.5283
13.402
13.3833*
13.4461
13.5812
13.7397
13.791
13.9323
14.0135

SBIC
14.4959
13.7845
13.7915
13.7779*
13.8721
14.0476
14.2955
14.5668
14.7309
14.985
15.179

Basic VAR model. Table 2 shows the estimation results of the VAR model. The R-squared of all the three
equations are significant, varying from 49% to 55%. The R-squared of the CBIRC equation is 55%, which
means that its own lags as well as the other two variables can explain over a half the change in CBIRC
monthly policy incidence. The estimation results of the coefficients are shown in Table 3. Focusing on
the coefficients of the CBIRC equation, we can see that the lags of CBIRC itself have strong positive
predictability. For the CSC, the first three lags are positive and significant. While when we turn to the
SAFE, only the first lag is negative and significant. To this extant, we can say that when predicting the
incidence of CBIRC policy, the number of “Construction” mentions in State Council regulations (CSC)
seems to matter more than the State Administration of Foreign Exchange policies (SAFE). Furthermore,
the influence of SAFE and CSC on the incidence of CBIRC policy is quite different because the sign of
their coefficients is just the opposite.
Table2 The estimation results of VAR model
Equation
CBIRC
SAFE
CSC

Parameters
16
16
16

RMSE
3.06877
2.94146
.894172

R-sq
0.5458
0.4887
0.5080

chi2
173.0173
137.6296
148.667

P>chi2
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Table3 The regression results of VAR model (CBIRC)
CBIRC
CBIRC

SAFE

CSC

L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.
_cons

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>z

[95% Conf. Interval]

-.7637145
-.7184406
-.5077614
-.2854951
-.0874662
-.2364482
-.0946199
.0174279
.0546062
.1324762
1.16483
.7287298
.9189278
.5771516
.2575376
.0705955

.0827709
.1014389
.1097958
.1021419
.0776041
.0863198
.1136863
.1185658
.1107783
.0853905
.2726465
.3489892
.3503567
.3544996
.29313
.2417656

-9.23
-7.08
-4.62
-2.80
-1.13
-2.74
-0.83
0.15
0.49
1.55
4.27
2.09
2.62
1.63
0.88
0.29

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.260
0.006
0.405
0.883
0.622
0.121
0.000
0.037
0.009
0.104
0.380
0.770

-.9259424
-.9172572
-.7229573
-.4856894
-.2395675
-.4056319
-.317441
-.2149568
-.1625153
-.0348861
.6304522
.0447236
.2322413
-.1176549
-.3169866
-.4032563

-.6014866
-.519624
-.2925655
-.0853007
.0646351
-.0672645
.1282013
.2498125
.2717277
.2998386
1.699207
1.412736
1.605614
1.271958
.8320618
.5444474

Tests for the VAR model. After the VAR model is estimated, several tests should be conducted to make
sure the model is built correctly. First, we’d like to use the Wald test to confirm the joint significance of
all lags. If all the lags are significant, then the chosen lag period tends to be correct. As shown in Table 4,
all the joint significance of coefficients are smaller than 1%, which means that the lag period is chosen
correctly. Second, if the model is built appropriately, then the residuals should follow a white noise
process and there is no self-correlation in the time series. Table 5 shows the results of LM test of
residuals, and we can not reject the null hypothesis that the series is not self-correlated, which means
the model is specified in a right way. Third, in order to make sure the VAR system is stable, we have to
calculate the eigenvalues of the variables. As shown in Figure 2, all the eigenvalues are smaller than 1,
indicating a stable VAR system. All these tests show that, the VAR model in our paper is set correctly and
can be used to do further analysis.

Table4 Wald test for the joint significance of all coefficients in VAR model
Equation
CBIRC
SAFE
CSC
All

lag
1
1
1
1

P> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

lag
2
2
2
2

P> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

lag
3
3
3
3

P> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

lag
4
4
4
4

P > chi2
0.013
0.043
0.000
0.000

lag
5
5
5
5

P> chi2
0.194
0.519
0.001
0.009

Table5 LM test for self-correlation of the residuals
lag
1
2

chi2
9.9431
7.0110

df
9
9

Prob > chi2
0.35511
0.63597

Forecasting. The results of basic VAR model show that State Administration of Foreign Exchange policies
(SAFE) and the number of “Construction” mentions in State Council regulations (CSC) have some
predictability power in the in-sample test. While, whether they can predict the incidence of CBIRC policy
in the out-of-sample is still not clear. So, we use the VAR model to predict the incidence of CBIRC policy
from 2017m7 to 2017m12, the results are shown in Figure 3. As we can see from Figure 3, the 95%
confidential interval covers the true value of the CBIRC, and the predicted value is close to the true value
as well, which means these two variables, SAFE and CSC, can also predict the incidence of the CBIRC
policy both in-sample and out-of-sample.

Figure2 Unit root test for the VAR model

Figure3 Forecasting with the VAR model

Granger Causality Test. After exploring the in-sample and out-of-sample predictability of SAFE and CSC.
We further want to know whether there is causal relationship among these variables. Or, in other
words, whether SAFE and CSC can add new information when predicting the incidence of CBIRC model.
The results are shown in Table 6. According to the results, both SAFE and CSC can be the Granger
causality of the incidence of CBIRC policy.
Table6 Granger causality test of VAR model
Equation
CBIRC
CBIRC
CBIRC
SAFE
SAFE
SAFE
CSC
CSC
CSC

Excluded
SAFE
CSC
ALL
CBIRC
CSC
ALL
CBIRC
SAFE
ALL

chi2
13.552
22.191
36.182
8.1119
4.1472
11.65
4.4637
2.4739
7.5115

df
5
5
10
5
5
10
5
5
10

Prob > chi2
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.150
0.528
0.309
0.485
0.780
0.676

Impulse Response. In order to capture the dynamic relationship between these variables, we further do
impulse response analysis. The basic concept of impulse response is that when the error term of one
specific variable change and with other conditions unchanged, what other variables will response in the
following periods. To be more specific, when the error term (or exogenous shocks) of the SAFE or CSC
changes, what will the CBIRC change. Figure 4 shows the results of the impulse response, and subfigure
1 to 3 show the response of CBIRC to the impulse of CBIRC, CSC and SAFE. We can see that CBIRC
response positively to its own shocks in period 0, then reverse in period 1 and then decrease to 0 in
period 3 and after that. So, the impact of the CBIRC shock is quite small on itself, which means when
there is an exogenous shock of CBIRC, the policy may increase immediately but then decrease and have
no impact after that. Similarly, the impact of CSC on the incidence of CBIRC policy is significantly positive
in period 1 and then significantly negative in period 2 and then decrease to 0 after that. However, the
impulse response of the SAFE is different from them. CBIRC responses negatively to the impulse of SAFE
in period 1 and then become positive in period 2 and become zero after that. So, we can conclude that,
both the change of SAFE and CSC can affect the CBIRC incidence, however, their impacts are just the
opposite and rather short and seems not to have long impacts on CBIRC incidence.

Figure4 The impulse response of CBIRC policy
Variance Decomposition. We the use the variance decomposition method to investigate the explanatory
power of different variables on one variable. To be more specific, how can the SAFE and CSC explain the
variance of the incidence of CBIRC in the short period and long period. The results are reported in Figure
5 and Table 7. We can see that, both variables can explain the variance of CBIRC, and the explanatory
power increases as the period becomes longer and finally become stable at a certain level. For the CBIRC
itself, after 24 period (i.e., 2 years) the variance explained by itself falls to 76%. And for the CSC and
SAFE, they can explain the variance of CBIRC by 14% and 10% in the long run, which indicates that they
are important factors that affect the incidence of CBIRC policy. Meanwhile, the CSC seems to matter
more than the SAFE in the long run. And combined with the above analysis, we can say that the CSC is a
more important predictor for the incidence of the CBIRC policy both in the short-run and long-run.

Figure5 The variance decomposition of VAR model

Table7 Variance decomposition of VAR model
Step
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Fevd: CBIRC
0
1
.907498
.818506
.81472
.806616
.803481
.790466
.768205
.761608
.761002
.760168
.76012
.759549
.759386
.759297
.759288
.759275
.75924
.759226
.759213
.759204
.759202
.759202
.759201

Fevd: SAFE
0
0
.029088
.064094
.063138
.068702
.071136
.085494
.100851
.101137
.101047
.101456
.10147
.102085
.102165
.102196
.102195
.1022
.102227
.102242
.102246
.102247
.102248
.102248
.102249

Fevd: CSC
0
0
.063414
.1174
.122142
.124682
.125383
.12404
.130944
.137255
.137951
.138377
.13841
.138366
.138449
.138507
.138517
.138524
.138533
.138532
.13854
.138548
.13855
.13855
.138551

Robustness test
We do several tests to make sure the results in our paper are robust. First, as mentioned before, the
HIQC and SBIC test show that 4 and 3 are optimal lag periods. So, we construct the VAR (3) and VAR (4)
model, and then test the relationship among these variables. Our main findings remain the same.
Second, the former papers argue that the order of the variables, thus affect the results of impulse
response and variance decomposition. So, we change the order of CBIRC, SAFE and CSC, and test
whether the results remain similar, and we find that the order do not affect the main results. Thus, the
results in our paper are robust.
Discussion
In this paper, we use VAR model to study the relationship between CBIRC policy incidence (CBIRC), State
Administration of Foreign Exchange policies (SAFE) and the number of “Construction” mentions in State
Council regulations (CSC), and test whether SAFE and CSC can predict the incidence of CBIRC policy. We
find that both SAFE and CSC are powerful predictors of the incidence of CBIRC. Meanwhile, the CSC can
positively and the SAFE can negatively predict the CBIRC incidence. The impulse response and variance
analysis reveals that State Council construction policies are a more important indicator to predict the
CBIRC incidence than the SAFE both in short-run and long-run.
It is interesting that CBIRC policies are not sensitive to financial and real variables, but are sensitive to
domestic construction and foreign exchange policy. State Council construction policies likely positively
influence CBIRC policies because banks have acted as major lenders to the construction sector. Under
China’s fiscal policies in the period under study, infrastructure has been frequently targeted as a means
to boost GDP during economic downturns. Construction is encouraged, and banks are frequently
expected to lend to firms that are engaged in new building. Thus it does not seem unnatural that these
policies are linked. With increased usage of construction and bank lending, it is likely that new policies
must be generated to reduce risks in each area.
Foreign exchange policy reflects both China’s currency liberalization efforts as well as perceived risks
with regard to the international monetary regime. Banking regulators are sensitive to SAFE policies, and
tend to refrain from making additional policies in the immediate aftermath of more SAFE policies. This
may be due to the shift in focus from the domestic economy to the international economy in the very
short run. Another plausible explanation for this relationship is that additional SAFE policies attempt to
control a very gradually liberalizing area in order to reduce exchange rate risk. As exchange rate risk
come increasingly under further control, the potential for exchange rate risk to migrate into the banking
sector is likely reduced, also reducing the need for new banking policies. The nuances for this hypothesis
have not been tested, and may be the subject of future research.
Based on the fact that CBIRC policies are influenced by State Council construction and SAFE policies, and
not on financial or real indicators, this tells us that CBIRC policies are very much reliant on the
government’s stance toward its own regulatory regime. It is the government’s position on foreign
exchange and domestic construction (major means of fiscal policy and source of risk) that governs its
response to banking risks. In other words, the overall industrial and foreign exchange regulatory
environment strongly influence how financial risks are dealt with. One can also say that CBIRC regulators
are watching the State Council and SAFE regulators for cues on how to interpret financial risks.

Conclusion
We provide an analysis of banking policies and indicators which precede them using a VAR framework.
We find that CBIRC policies are predicted by State Council construction policies and policies set by the
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and not by financial and real variables. This indicates that the
CBIRC is inward-looking, observing what other regulators are doing rather than responding to changes in
the real and financial economy. This may be a product of market distortions due to China’s unique blend
of state-oriented and market-based institutions.
Data Availability
The data used are from a private sources, the Wanfang Database.
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